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Abstract 
 
 
This paper argues that the categorical authority of love’s imperatives is derived from a sentimental 
contract. The problem is defined and the paper argues against two recent attempts to explain the authority 
of love’s demands by Velleman and Frankfurt. An argument is then set out in which it is shown that a 
constructivist approach to the problem explains the sources of love’s justifications. The paper 
distinguishes between the moral and the romantic case but argues that the sources of authority are 
paralleled in each. The paper ends by asking what we are to say when the demands of morality and the 
demands of love conflict. 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
C.S. Lewis (1963: 103) identifies a characteristic of romantic love that often becomes 
most apparent when the imperatives of romantic love and the demands of morality 
collide. He writes: 
 
When lovers say of some act that we might blame, “Love made us do 
it,” notice the tone. A man saying, “I did it because I was frightened,” or 
“I did because I was angry,” speaks quite differently. He is putting 
forward an excuse for what he feels requires excusing. But the lovers are 
seldom doing quite that. Notice how tremously, almost how devoutly, 
they say the word love, not so much pleading an “extenuating 
circumstance” as appealing to an authority. 
 
To say that love has authority is to claim that love has its reasons. More fully, it is to 
say that love’s normative judgments belong within a schema of justification that 
provides reasons that can be offered and shared. To say, as a lover, that I did something  
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in the name of love is to say that I was justified in my action and that I am in a position 
to offer reasons for my actions (or beliefs). Not just any reasons will do when we speak 
of authority. Some reasons explain, but here I am concerned with reasons that justify 
and so I am interested in categorical reasons rather than hypothetical ones. A 
categorical reason engages the motivations of subjects directly hence its authority. It 
does not defer to other reasons but claims the authority to command the will. 
 
In this paper I will argue that the usual ways of connecting romantic love and reasons 
fail to account for either the particularity of love or for the justificatory role of love’s 
reasons. In place of the usual approaches I will offer an account of love as a sentimental 
contract resting on a theory of romantic constructivism. Although this approach is 
counterintuitive I believe it offers a philosophically satisfying account of the authority 
of love’s judgments. More particularly, it explains how romantic love can be a genuine 
reason for action and belief and it explains how the demands of morality and love can 
genuinely conflict. To make good on theses claims I need to accomplish two tasks. 
First, I need to say why I think romantic love has its reasons and show why these are 
justifying, authoritative and thus categorical reasons. Second, I need to explain how 
these reasons acquire their authority. The outcome of my argument will be a sketch of a 
theory of love as a sentimental contract and a new account of love’s conflict with 
morality. 
 
I have divided my discussion into five parts. First, I offer some grounds for thinking of 
love’s judgments as anchored in reasons rather than being merely expressions of a ‘mad 
passion’. Second, I argue that J. D.  Velleman’s way of connecting romantic love to 
justificatory reasons is mistaken because it sacrifices the essential particularity of love. 
Third, I argue that Harry Frankfurt’s explanation of the authority of love correctly 
identifies the categorical character of love’s imperatives but he achieves this only by 
sacrificing the justificatory requirement for love’s authority. In the fourth section I set 
out my account of love as a sentimental contract arguing that it corrects the deficiencies 
in Velleman’s account by retaining the particularity of love and corrects the 
deficiencies in Frankfurt’s account by grounding love’s reasons in a scheme of 
justification. Finally, I briefly address the conflict between love and morality and show 
that it is a genuine conflict between two incompatible but closely related registers of 
justification. 
 
 
I. 
 
In what sense does romantic love have its reasons? Typically love is thought of as being 
beyond reason but I think this is a mistake. In the philosophical literature on love we 
can identify two positions – one that adopts the view that love is irrational and another 
that takes love to be fundamentally a rational enterprise. It will useful to outline these 
positions before I set out some considerations in favor of the latter account. I want to 
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start the discussion of love’s judgments by distinguishing between what I will call 
idealization definitions of romantic love and discernment definitions. The former take 
the object of love to be an idealized representation of the beloved while the latter argues 
that love properly understood is matter of discerning the true features of the beloved. 
 
We can begin with this anecdote from Stendhal (1947: 6) 
 
At the salt mines of Salzburg, they throw a leafless wintery bough into 
one of the abandoned workings. Two or three months later they haul it 
out covered with a shining deposit of crystals. The smallest twig, no 
bigger than a tom tit's claw, is studded with a galaxy of scintillating 
diamonds. The original branch is no longer recognizable. 
 
Crystallization is what Stendhal calls the process of idealization which is essential to 
the process of falling in love. The lovers over-evaluate each other's qualities, idealize 
each other, and transform the other in each of their minds from a plain bough into a 
“galaxy of scintillating diamonds”. While crystallization occurs at the beginning of the 
process of falling in love it continues, says Stendhal, “throughout love almost without a 
break.” He goes on to say (1947: 6): 
 
The process is something like this: whenever all is not well between you 
and your beloved, you crystallize out an imaginary solution. Only 
through imagination can you be sure that your beloved is perfect in any 
given way. 
 
The lovers’ whispered “sweet nothings” are almost always literally false - “You are the 
most beautiful/clever/sexy/whatever in the world”. On this account the lovers are the 
bare scaffold for the draperies of each other's imaginative projections. Each engages in 
a process of willful self-deception concerning the merits and attributes of the other. 
There is on this view a kind of consensual imagining between the protagonists, what we 
might call a conspiracy of delusions. So, here crystallization is a necessary element in 
the process of falling and being in love. At its base is an exchange of promiscuous 
imaginings. 
 
What is crucial to emphasize here is the irrationality at the core of this projective 
account of love. The idealization is constituted by a set of false beliefs entertained and 
accepted by the lovers. This is most often explained as the result of some overwhelming 
passion, a “divine madness”. The passion of love misdirects our usually reliable 
attention to the world and distorts systematically our capacity to distinguish true and 
false beliefs about our partner. So, the idealization view says that lovers are essentially 
irrational in subscribing to false beliefs about their beloved and irrational in submitting 
to a passion that systematically misdirects their cognitive powers. 
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In contrast to Stendhal’s commitment to the irrationality of love Ortega (1967: 145) 
rejects both parts of the idealization view. Firstly, he denies that genuine romantic love 
is a “passion” which he says is a “pathological state which implies defectiveness of the 
soul.” He calls on his readers to “cease believing that the measure of a man’s love lies 
in how stupid he has become or is willing to be.” Instead, genuine love implies an 
“enchantment” and a feeling of “total surrender”. This enchantment and surrender is not 
brought about by desire or passion but rather through “perception”, “emotion” and 
“constitution”. Perception for Ortega is discernment, the capacity to take a 
“disinterested interest” in another person and see her as she is. Ortega is at pains to 
make clear that he does not mean to “intellectualize” love. Enchantment is an emotion 
that suitably sensitive souls can experience. His point is to say that love is not “blind” 
or “irrational”. Love, he says, has its reasons and these reasons are rooted in the 
qualities of the beloved, qualities that a lover can discern in his “disinterested 
interestedness”. He concludes “that in true love it is essential for there to be a moment 
of discernment, which reveals that character of the individual in which sentiment has 
found reason to sprout and blossom.” Thus Ortega rejects the second part of the 
idealization view that love is irrational. 
 
I want to go along with Ortega by rejecting both the view that love is nothing more than 
an overwhelming passion and, more importantly, rejecting the opinion that love is in its 
essential aspect irrational. However I think both Stendhal and Ortega trade on a very 
narrow understanding of what is meant by rationality. To say that a lover’s belief about 
her beloved is false is, I suppose, to say that this belief cannot be shared by others 
unless they too occupy the lover’s peculiar and particular place in the world. For 
example, Alcibiades’s claim that Socrates’s snub nose is a love-worthy feature is 
strictly false if the test is whether others see his nose as love-worthy too (worthy of 
being loved by them). However, although this belief is strictly false if we take up a 
“view from nowhere,” it is still a claim with rational features. A view from somewhere 
can be rational and in the case of love such a view particularizes and articulates a 
system of love-worthy characteristics. So, if it is pointed out to me that what I take to 
be my beloved’s toothy smile (an important love-worthy property for me) is in fact 
clever stage make-up, then I am constrained by reason to either say that I no longer love 
her or to find some other reason to find her love-worthy. The idea that I am subject to 
an illusion is completely wrong. The snub nose or toothy smile you see is the same as I 
see, what differs is that snub noses and toothy smiles fit within a system of motivating 
reasons I have adopted. There is no illusion as such (as the visual metaphor of 
crystallization implies). Now, it is true that the genealogy of both the reasons and their 
motivating powers may be and often is much deeper and darker than most of us 
recognize. However, this does not disqualify them as reasons that are subject to certain 
rules and consequences. Even the claim that the belief that a snub nose is a love-worthy 
characteristic is false is not quite right. The view from nowhere does not make such 
beliefs false, rather it indicates that such beliefs are neither true nor false. 
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It is important to emphasize that I do not mean that love is a cold and calculating 
intellectual decision. This would be absurd, as Ortega points out. However, deep 
emotions, “surrenders of the will,” “magical enchantments,” falling in love and being in 
love can all be motivated by reasons and exist with a reason-giving framework. Where 
reason departs the scene completely of any human activity, then humanity departs along 
with it. We are capable of human love precisely because we are capable of 
understanding and giving reasons. And it is this insight that Ortega’s discernment view 
of romantic love brings to the surface. 
 
We are led away from Ortega’s insight because we fail to distinguish between romantic 
love understood as exclusively an emotion and romantic love understood as both 
grounds for a judgment and as a source of authoritative imperatives. These are usually 
entwined because our judgments concerning our beloved are premised on having 
certain feelings, and the imperatives of love are often ‘justified’ by the fact that the 
lover feels a particular way and that she believes certain things. However, when 
assessing the claim that love is irrational, it is important to keep these aspects apart. As 
I have pointed out, love’s judgments are subject to the test of rationality (they are 
revisable in the light of evidence) and judgments about love-worthiness are reason-
giving judgments insofar as they stand as justifications for the feelings. In addition to 
these rational qualities of love I want to defend the idea that one can be in love and 
under love’s obligations even when one does not feel love’s affection for the beloved. I 
should be clear here that I do not mean Kant’s peculiar notion of “universal love,” a 
love stripped entirely of any particularity. Instead I want to say that on any occasion 
one can have a reason to fulfill one’s romantic duties and that this duty obtains entirely 
independently of any affective attachment on that particular occasion. Now this idea 
can be cashed out in two ways. Firstly, one might have no affection (no passion, no 
emotion) at the time of recognizing and acting on one’s romantic duty. Secondly, one 
might have, counterfactually, fulfilled one’s romantic duty even if the affection one 
does feel was absent. Such duties therefore have a categorical character and depend on 
an agent’s being moved by reason rather than being moved by passion alone. 
Obviously, the claim is not that romantic duties can hold between people who have 
never felt love’s affection for one another. Instead I am arguing that a romantic love 
relationship, founded on and most likely sustained by affective ties, has imperatives 
that are not necessarily grounded in an occurrent emotion. This is to say that the 
justification and authority of such imperatives lies outside the particular feelings of 
being in love1
 
. What this justification is I will set out later when I turn to my account of 
a sentimental contract.  
I have rejected the idea that love is irrational by arguing that love’s judgments fit within 
a scheme of reasons that constrain the lover and that serve as public justifications, and I 
have rejected the idea that love is essentially a “mad passion” by arguing that love’s 
imperatives can be justified independently of an occurrent affection for the beloved. In 
short, love’s judgments are subject to reflective scrutiny (they are revisable), and love’s 
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imperatives are binding independently of any particular passion or sentiment (they are 
categorical). Are these criteria enough to ground the rationality of love? One reason to 
think not concerns the scope of both love’s judgments and imperatives. The reasons of 
love, as I argued above, are particular to the lover and so lack one characteristic that it 
might seem is a requirement for a fully-fledged reason, namely, generality. A reason is 
general when it incorporates the possibility of others adopting the same reason in the 
same given circumstances. The reasons of morality are general in this sense since it 
doesn’t matter who someone is, it matters only that they occupy a particular situation. 
This secures the impartiality of morality’s imperatives. However, the particularity of 
the who is essential to love. If love’s reasons are revisable and categorical, as I have 
argued, must they also be general, and if so, can they be?  
 
 
II. 
 
One instructive approach to this problem of generality is offered in argument by J. D. 
Velleman. It is instructive for two reasons. First, it purchases generality at the expense 
of romantic love itself, as I will argue. In doing so it emphasizes that particularity has to 
lie at the center of an account of love and its reasons, and it forces us to look to another 
way of reconciling particularity with generality. Second, it offers a clue to how this can 
be achieved by pointing us towards morality as a model for explaining love’s authority. 
 
Velleman states the problem in the following fashion (1999: 340): 
 
The Kantian moral agent cleaves to his loved ones only on condition that 
he can regard cleaving to loved ones as reasonable for anyone, and 
thereby seems to entertain “one thought too many” for cleaving to them 
at all. 
 
The “one thought too many” quotation is, of course, the gist of Bernard Williams’s 
criticism of any universal morality, that is any morality Kantian or utilitarian that fails 
to recognize the particularities of our moral concerns. How then is the requirement of 
universality (the generality of reasons and the requirement of impartiality) for Kantian 
moral imperatives to be made compatible with the “cleaving” of love to particular 
individuals and not to others? The point here is that romantic love seems not only 
incompatible with the requirements of a Kantian morality but also in direct opposition 
to the obligations of a Kantian moral agent. 
 
The direction of Velleman’s suggested solution is not to question the impartiality of 
morality but to question the partiality of love and in making the object of love non-
particular he concludes that love can be a moral emotion. The non-particular that is the 
object of our love is the intelligible self, the self that Kant says we have a duty treat as 
an end and so with respect, awe and reverence. This respect might indeed give us 
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reason to love a person, but the motivation for this love is no different from the 
motivation we would have to love any other person. This looks like the love Kant 
describes as “love of one’s neighbor” or love for humanity2
  
. The fact that a love of this 
sort is directed to any particular person is accidental. There is, it seems, nothing about 
the person herself that distinguishes her from another person and so there is nothing 
particular that such a love can get a grip on. However, Velleman does offer a handle for 
the grip of partiality and the particular. He argues that (1999: 372): 
One reason why we love some people rather than others is that we can 
see into only some of our observable fellow creatures … Hence the 
value that makes someone eligible to be loved does not necessarily make 
him lovable in our eyes. Whether someone is lovable depends on how 
well his value as a person is expressed or symbolized for us by his 
empirical persona. 
 
Partiality in our love relationships arises because only some empirical selves trigger 
this respect and awe. But what we love when we love morally is what everyone has and 
that is a rational will. The particular is a route for the universal, a path enabling us to 
get beyond the phenomenal world to the noumenal world of universal essences. The 
empirical beloved is a means by which I come to respect her true self (a self that is 
indistinguishable from any other self). A love is impartial because what is loved in a 
beloved is shared by all others. However, the lover loves a particular person because 
only she exemplifies what is worth loving in a way that can be accessed by the lover. 
So, the particulars matter - the snub nose, the toothy smile, the gentle disposition - but 
not as objects of love in themselves, but as means to love the inner, universal essence of 
humankind. Has Velleman rescued love for morality? Can romantic love be universal 
and therefore meet the requirement of generality set out earlier? The question to ask 
here is at what cost has this impartiality been purchased? I think it has been purchased 
at the cost of love itself. 
 
Velleman’s strategy takes very seriously a distinction Kant relies on between our 
animal selves and our intelligible selves. The former is the site of contingency and 
particularity. The latter is the site of what we share with all other rational beings. If we 
reflect on what it means to “see through” the empirical persona in a love relationship, 
what it means to the person who is seen through, then, I think, we will begin to see the 
cruelty and lovelessness contained in Velleman’s proposal. The idea that the 
phenomenal world is means of ‘seeing through’ is a familiar claim in Kantian and neo-
Kantian aesthetics. A painting for example opens up a gateway to the noumenal. The 
experience of the sublime is another opportunity for us to grasp the noumenal3. 
Artworks and the great events of nature are therefore like one’s beloved in this respect. 
They are a means towards the end of a communion with a world beyond the contingent 
and the particular. The problem is beginning to take shape. The beloved’s golden hair, 
her divine breath, the blush of desire on her cheek are all to be seen through. Her 
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feelings of affection and passion, her intense interest in you, her concerns about a 
future, her love itself is to be seen through. The beloved is no more present as a person 
than the canvas surface of a painting or the wild winds of a great storm. To love in this 
way is either to be crushingly cruel as Kierkegaard’s protagonist is in The Seducer’s 
Diary, or to be foolish as Werther is in Goethe’s The Sorrows of Young Werther. 
 
To see how poorly Velleman’s argument fares take the example of the film of The 
English Patient4
 
. Count Ladislaus betrays the trust of a friend and colleague when he 
seduces Katherine Clifton away from her husband, and on the grounds of a whispered 
lover’s promise he kills a man and then betrays his country, knowing that the 
consequences of this action will likely mean deaths of large numbers of his 
compatriots. The Count’s justification is that he loves Katherine. On Velleman’s 
account this justification makes no sense at all. The man the Count murders and the 
many soldiers whose lives he jeopardizes are all equally worthy of his love. The only 
difference is that they lack the particular features that allow him to “see through” them. 
His promise to Katherine cannot be “I will return for you no matter what.” It can only 
be “I will return for you only if doing so is compatible with respecting the rational wills 
of all others since I have equal reason to love them”. This really does look like “one 
thought too many.” In a peculiar irony it looks like Velleman is suggesting that we use 
the animality of the beloved as means to achieve the end of a universal aim. Love 
achieves its moral status in this scheme only by making itself blind to what matters 
most to the beloved - her particularity. 
Love cannot be a moral emotion because love, properly understood, cannot take on the 
rigid requirement of impartiality, and thus generality, without losing its essential 
character as love. On Velleman’s account love’s reasons are revisable (a lover can be 
mistaken about what particulars allow her to access the rational will of her beloved) and 
love’s reasons are categorical (the imperative to love the humanity in the other is not a 
hypothetical one for either Kant or Velleman). Velleman also fails to account for the 
generality of love’s reasons. However, there some important lessons to be learned from 
this failure. First, we need some mechanism by which to generate the right sort of 
generality for love’s reasons. The “view from nowhere” that is the usual standard for 
generality for our epistemic beliefs is obviously not the right sort of generality. A 
Kantian “view from nowhere” (the Kingdom of Ends) is also not the right answer. Both 
approaches elide the essential particularity of love. What is needed then is a view from 
somewhere that has some generality (enough to ground love’s imperatives) but which 
holds on to the particularity necessary for romantic love. It is only if we can achieve 
this outcome that love and reasons will be properly connected and the authority of love 
explained. Second, Velleman points us towards a fertile source for thinking about the 
generality of reasons, namely morality. I will take both of these lessons into my account 
of love a sentimental contract. However, before doing so I want to examine an 
argument that seems to meet the requirements so far set out for love to have its 
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distinctive reasons and which also purports to explain the nature of the clash between 
love and morality. 
 
 
 III. 
 
Harry Frankfurt (1999, pp. 129-141) has argued that the imperatives of love carry 
authority. His claim is not that they are moral requirements but that love’s imperatives 
share with moral oughts a categorical nature. It is this categorical feature that gives love 
its authority. I think Frankfurt is correct in this claim. As I argued earlier we can be 
moved to meet the demands of love independently of any particular interests and 
feelings at the time of the demand. This only makes sense if love has a call on us that is 
categorical rather than hypothetical. However, I dispute Frankfurt’s grounds for his 
claim. I will argue that he gives up the place of reason in love’s claim to authority and 
thereby destroys that authority. 
 
Frankfurt, unlike Velleman, agrees that love is partial in its aims. It is he says 
“paradigmatically personal.”  However, love’s demands originate, he says, in an 
“essential character” of the will and are not therefore either “adventitious” or an 
external force acting on the passive will. Love then forms part of the “volitional” 
structure of the agent and so acting in accord with his structure is to be ruled by one’s 
essential nature and this, says Frankfurt, parallels Kant’s account of autonomy. He says 
(1999: 138) that the necessities of love “define our volitional boundaries. They mark 
our volitional limits, and thus they delineate our shapes as persons.” Love is not self-
interested but a disinterested interest, it is active rather than passive, and its commands 
come from within rather than from heteronomous sources. 
 
…the commands of love are also categorical. The claims that are made 
upon us by our ideals or by our children, or by whatever we may love 
disinterestedly and without conditions, are as unconditional and as 
unyielding as those of morality and reason. (Frankfurt 1999: 136) 
 
Love in this sense is not a passion, an intense feeling that overwhelms the will and 
moves us by force to act in the name of love. He argues that we cannot will ourselves to 
love but once we love we are necessitated by love’s demands. A mere passion however 
forceful has no claim to authority, whereas an essential aspect of our motivational 
structure, an aspect that is part of who we are, has an authority. In being obedient to its 
demands we obey ourselves and so we exhibit our autonomy by conforming to what we 
are. We could only escape the demands and authority of reason for example by being 
different kinds of creatures. It is in being true to our constitution that we are fully 
autonomous. Likewise, Frankfurt says (1999: 135) “The will of the lover is rigorously 
constrained. Love is not a matter of choice.” And further that (1999: 136) “The 
captivity of love cannot be entered or escaped just by choosing to do so.” Frankfurt thus 
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connects the authority of love’s demands to keeping true to one’s “essential nature”. 
When one fails to meet these categorical demands “he fails to treat himself 
unequivocally as an end.” (1999: 139) 
 
I think Frankfurt’s argument answers the question of how a lover takes himself to have 
authority. From the inner perspective, from the stance of the lover, the sense of 
authority that accompanies love’s judgments is well explained. The lover wants to say 
that he meets the duties of love because he must and that this “must” is not the must of 
an external force, either an overwhelming passion or unconscious acting-out. It seems 
to him therefore to be an imperative that is as much categorical as the imperatives of 
epistemic rationality and morality. However something very important gets lost in 
Frankfurt’s account. The authority the lover claims is not rationally communicable to 
others. It is not an authority connected in an appropriate way to justification. Others can 
be empathetic with the lover’s claims, can perhaps see how he takes himself to have 
authority, but there is no room here for agreement with his authority. We can perhaps 
recognize this authority but we cannot acknowledge it. From the outside perspective the 
claim to authority is no more rationally compelling than the excuse of a “mad passion”. 
But a lover who acts in accord with love’s demands is doing more than this. He is 
claiming authority because he takes himself to be justified. And this justification is 
supposed to reach out beyond the magical sphere of the beloveds and engage not only 
the sympathy and perhaps admiration of others but also their reasoned consent. 
Frankfurt’s strategy cuts off this possibility. 
 
To see the difficulty here one only has to compare a claim to romantic autonomy that 
Frankfurt supports with a claim to a consuming, irresistible passion. In the latter case 
the best that can be offered on behalf of a lover who has acted badly is that she is 
excused a moral wrong-doing. The contrast that we need to be alert to is the difference 
between excuses and justifications. One might claim for example that the necessities of 
love can trump the claims of morality either because being in love is an excuse (the 
person in question is not responsible for her action or choice), or because being in love 
is a justification for her action or choice (although she is responsible for what she did it 
was not wrong). In the former case we might say that although her actions, the betrayal 
of a spouse say, caused morally significant harm, she is not responsible. She is excused, 
because in some sense the action was not properly her action. She did not do it. In the 
latter case, though her betrayal caused significant harm it was not wrong, she was 
justified in her actions because her love cancels the moral significance of the harm she 
has caused.5
 
 
Frankfurt’s argument confuses excuses and justification. For, while his argument makes 
acting on love’s demands in some sense central to the character of the person who acts, 
he also argues that the lover is compelled and has no alternative to her actions. Where 
we assign responsibility we presuppose choice. Kant’s suggestion (1996: 45) that we 
set up a gallows outside the house of someone about to act on an “irresistible” passion 
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is made in support of his argument that we are not only responsible for what we do but 
that we always have a choice because we are autonomous agents. When Frankfurt 
disconnects choice and autonomy he muddles the excusable with the justified. If it is 
part of the “essential character” and “volitional structure” of Count Ladislaus for 
example that he betray his country to fulfil a lover’s promise, then he either chooses 
this act and so is responsible for it, or he is compelled and is possibly excused his moral 
responsibility. 
 
So I reject Frankfurt’s account of the authority of love’s demands. I have argued that he 
fails to connect the idea of authority with the idea of justification and I have argued that 
he muddles the ideas of justification and excuse. At the root of these problems is an 
ambivalence in the notion of what is meant by “categorical”. In one sense a categorical 
reason signifies a “must” for the person offering such a reason insofar as the reason 
does not rest on other reasons and thus the chain of reason-giving has come to an end. 
In another sense a categorical reason is a special form of justification that stands, as it 
were, alone, unsupported and the justification is independent of the force of the reason 
(its “mustness”) for the person who is offering it. The “mustness” of a categorical 
reason and the justification it offers go together. Frankfurt wrongly pulls them apart and 
so any successful account of love’s authority, its reason-giving character, has to ensure 
that both senses of the categorical are preserved. 
 
 
IV. 
 
What is required then to keep the ideas of authority and justification in contact with one 
another. We need to explain how love gets its justificatory authority while attending to 
our earlier argument that the scope of love’s imperatives are partial. Although love’s 
demands are not moral, morality can offer us a clue here. A contractarian approach to 
morality argues that its imperatives derive their justification from an agreement6. It is 
because agents would have agreed to certain principles by following a procedure 
defined by the proper standards of practical reason that these principles have a 
categorical force. The idea is that once we suitably define agents, the circumstances of 
their bargaining and the procedures of their deliberation, then we have the basis for 
justifying the principles that emerge. The justification on offer here is addressed to real, 
empirical agents who reflect on what they would have agreed to in the absence of the 
distortions of their particularities and narrow individual concerns. The approach is 
constructivist. Moral constructivism has been largely modeled on what Rawls calls 
“Kantian constructivism”. The parties to the Kantian agreement are idealized versions 
of ourselves. The scope of the agreement is universal thus giving it its moral character. 
The categorical force of morality’s demands is explained therefore by this abstraction 
from the “pathological” individuality and closed perspective of individual agents. I 
must act in accord with such principles because this is what I would choose as a fully 
autonomous rational and reasonable agent. I claim authority in my actions because they 
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are justified by this hypothetical agreement and I can communicate my authority to 
others by making them acknowledge and perhaps share my reasons. 
 
Can the normative character of a love relationship rest on agreement? Love itself 
cannot of course be defined as an agreement (for love need not be reciprocated), but, I 
argue, love’s obligations, duties, necessities and imperatives arise through an implicit, 
perhaps implied and sometimes actual agreement. Such an agreement provides the 
claim to authority and thus justification for what is done in the name of love. It also 
provides the grounds of resentment when lovers fail in their romantic duties. The 
agreement thus introduces the required normative dimension to a passionate exchange 
and it establishes a regime of “oughts”. 
 
We can think of this as romantic constructivism in contrast to moral or political 
constructivism. The parties to the agreement are idealized versions of the lovers. Not 
idealized versions of lovers as such, but idealized versions of the particular lovers. 
Here, as in the moral case, when confronted by a romantic dilemma we abstract from 
the occurrent feelings of the moment and the frailties of will, and ask what we would 
have agreed to as a principle to guide action. The parties to the agreement are of course 
the lovers themselves and so the principles will be particularized and the burdens and 
requirements most likely asymmetrical. Let us take an obvious example. When 
confronted with a temptation to cheat on a lover it is possible to put oneself in an 
“original romantic position” and ask what you and your partner would have agreed to 
independently of the current feelings and temptations. What is veiled in this seeking of 
a point of reflective equilibrium is the particularities of the moment and what is 
revealed is an idealized conception of the lover and her beloved. 
 
The authority of the principles that emerge from an agreement rests on the procedure of 
construction. In the moral case the procedure models a conception of persons as 
morally capable agents, together with an account of practical reason and a way of 
ensuring or testing the universal scope of the principles. In the romantic case the 
procedure models a conception of particular persons as romantically capable agents and 
an account of practical reason. When a lover declares “I love you” this can be 
understood in three different ways. Firstly, it can be understood as a description of 
present feelings. Secondly, as a prediction about future feelings, or thirdly as a speech 
act that invites the beloved to initiate a normatively structured romantic relationship. 
The commitment that this act invites is similar to the commitment that a promise 
initiates but is also instructively different. The moral authority a particular promise has 
is grounded on a universalizable principle of promise keeping. The authority that a love 
commitment has (say a principle of sexual exclusivity) rests on a non-universalizable 
principle. While anyone similarly situated in the moral case is constrained to act in 
accord with the moral principle, in the romantic case one’s situation is defined by the 
fact of being in love with the beloved. This latter circumstance is not universalizable 
and so the constraints introduced by the agreement are particular to the parties to the 
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agreement. This is what distinguishes the moral from the romantic. However, there are 
also important similarities between the moral and the romantic case. In the moral case 
the parties are supposed to be capable of acting on principle and therefore recognizing 
the categorical character of the imperatives that emerge from the agreement. They are, 
in Rawls’ language, “reasonable”. In the romantic case the same is supposed. The 
lovers can act and decide independently of their interests and passions, broadly 
understood. They are other-regarding (although this other is one particular other) and 
they recognize the categorical nature of their commitments. Love, like morality, is very 
demanding. 
 
It is now possible to distinguish three types of agreement – moral, romantic and 
prudential. Moral and romantic agreements both require persons capable of acting on 
principle, but in a prudential agreement the parties act from the motive of satisfying 
their own interests exclusively. Moral agreements have a universal scope whereas 
romantic and prudential agreements have a restricted scope limited to parties to the 
agreement. This shows us that romantic agreements share some features with both 
moral and prudential agreements but are distinguishable from both. 
 
The agreements that moral constructivists are concerned with are hypothetical. They 
are accessed by reflection and stand as a measure of our moral successes and failures. 
Normatively significant romantic agreements can be actual, implied or hypothetical. 
The construction of a “we” that a romantic relationship initiates is sometimes a very 
public event with explicit promises made. Sometimes expectations are merely implied 
by behaviors and words. But at any time it is possible to enter into the romantic original 
position and ask “What would we have agreed to as the principles that form the 
normative basis of our relationship?” This allows the parties to access a standard by 
which to judge their romantic success and failures. Now, not every love relationship has 
a normative dimension although I would argue that most do. Love understood as no 
more than “mad passion”, even if this passion is shared by both parties, has no 
normativity internal to it. The lovers have no grounds for resentment if the other fails 
her expectations. In fact there is no sense in which one really has expectations of the 
other in this situation rather than merely making predictions about the beloved’s future 
actions. 
 
So the claim here is that the authority and justification of the romantic ought, of love’s 
imperatives, is a sentimental contract. It is sentimental because love is, of course, based 
in the sentiments - emotions, as well as attitudes, and beliefs. But romantic love is more 
than sentiment; it is a normative engagement of limited scope. The parties to the 
agreement are, as I have said, the lovers, and it would be a mistake to think of these as 
the empirically situated lovers. The parties are abstractions of the lover and the beloved. 
These abstractions are not Stendhal’s illusions and idealizations. The agreement 
projects itself into the future by engaging the future selves of the couple in a normative 
arrangement that has a categorical call on their reason. It is by discerning the lover in 
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her present empirical reality, recognizing her love-worthy qualities (as Ortega requires), 
and committing oneself to be true to one’s reason rather than one’s passion, that the 
lovers enter a normatively significant agreement. While the “golden hair” attracts the 
potential lover by being for him a love-worthy quality he abstracts from that contingent 
particularity and contracts with his beloved in all her present and future particularities. 
His concern is with her essential and real self rather than with what currently triggers 
his affection. Most particularly the sentimental contract abstracts from the ebb and flow 
of sentiment and regard. Abstractions need not be illusions. Ortega’s discernment and 
“magical enchantment” can run together without collapsing into a willful self-
deception. Of course, we are epistemically frail and our “discernments” are sometimes 
errors. It is on these occasions when lovers claim exemption from their romantic duties. 
When one party claims that the other is not who she thought he was, she claims that the 
agreement was made under falsifying conditions. Where idealization is self-deception 
then the claim to love’s authority is naturally put into question. It is only when 
discernment and abstraction go together that this authority claims our serious attention. 
 
I have described the normativity of the romantic agreement a sentimental contract. The 
reader might ask what role sentiment plays if lovers are supposed to abstract from their 
sentiments. The contract is sentimental in the sense that it rests on and presupposes the 
existence of love’s sentiments. Without the feelings that love evokes the agreement 
would not be a romantic one. But this is not to say that one is to be guided in one’s 
romantic duties by the sentiments, feelings and passions of love. The duties of love are 
spelled out in the contract. One can fulfill these duties lovingly and passionately but the 
authoritative source of the duty is not passion but reason. 
 
I have said that the duties of the lover are assigned independently of whether he feels a 
certain way on a particular occasion. Thus the commitment of the lovers is a 
commitment of abstracted present selves to future selves. And so the imperatives that 
emerge from this agreement have the familiar categorical quality that moral imperatives 
have. And they have this quality for the same reasons. The lover argues “I must do this 
because this is what I agreed to in my persona qua lover.” The beloved argues “She 
must do this because she, in her persona as lover, agreed to it.” When the lover is 
challenged she claims the authority of love and the source of her authority is the 
sentimental contract. This explains how we can act in the name of love even when our 
feelings are not engaged (actually or counterfactually). 
 
Love is not a moral emotion. It lacks universal scope and so it cannot qualify as moral. 
Love is sometimes a claim to justification. It only succeeds in this insofar as love’s 
reasons are communicable. While I am not party to the sentimental contracts of others I 
can acknowledge the justification that arises from them. I can say that I too would have 
a reason to act thus and so in that situation if I were party to the agreement. This is very 
different from saying that I would have another’s feelings if I were in his situation. I 
cannot have another’s feelings, but I can have his reasons. It is this that marks the 
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difference between claiming justification for what one does rather than seeking an 
excuse. In the former case I am asking for you to understand and recognize my reasons, 
whereas in the latter case I am asking you to forgive the absence of reasons. 
 
What is important to note at this point is how the issue of generality and particularity is 
addressed in this account. While the romantic agreement is not universalizable and so is 
not general in that sense, it is also not wholly particular either. The agreement insofar as 
it is a construction entered into by an idealized version of the lovers abstracts from the 
empirical particularity of the lovers and so is general in the sense of being a step back 
from the empirically particular toward an outside, more objective, view. Another way 
of thinking of this is to say that an external standard is set for the lovers that measures 
their romantic successes and failings. This is not a “view from nowhere” but is it is also 
not a view from with the closed perspective of a empirical individual. We might think 
of this as a partial generality. It is enough, I suggest, to provide the reasons lovers offer 
for their actions with the stamp of rationality. For while an outsider is not party the 
romantic agreement she can understand that anyone who is party to such an agreement 
has duties and obligations in respect of it. She doesn’t have to know who you are in 
particular, she only has to know what the agreement commands. While this is not the 
generality we want for epistemic reasons or for moral reasons it is, I suggest, precisely 
the sort of generality we want for romantic reasons. The particularity of the lovers is 
preserved since it is they who enter the agreement and are bound by it but enough 
generality is created by the agreement to ground the possibility of justification for the 
reasons lovers offer for their actions. 
 
I have suggested in rather a rough way how the claim to love can acquire authority and 
offer a justification. In the final section I want to return to the issue raised at the 
beginning and examine the moment when love and duty ask and demand very different 
things of us. What sense then can we give the idea that love can trump the demands of 
morality? 
 
 
V. 
 
At the end of Velleman’s article he returns to Williams’s lifeboat example. Should a 
person favor her spouse over several other people? Is entertaining the very question a 
failure of a sort by the husband as Williams suggests? Velleman says, as he must, that 
no choice can be made. What is valuable on his account is located beyond any 
particularity. He says (1999: 374): 
 
These cases invite us to imagine situations in which we feel forced to 
make choices among things that cannot coherently be treated as 
alternatives, because their values are incomparable. 
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My response to Williams’s example matches Velleman’s but my grounds are very 
different. What we have is two different registers of justification. When we occupy the 
register of morality we see, understand and acknowledge the drive to universalize and 
smooth over particularities. We have reasons not to favor a loved one, reasons that we 
can communicate to others who can share these reasons with us. When we are asked to 
explain ourselves we don’t say “I couldn’t help myself,” we say I had to do it and we 
call on all the authority of morality to support ourselves. However, when we occupy the 
register of love we particularize. We have reasons, not excuses, that we offer others and 
which others can come to share. Our choice lays claim to authority. This is why we 
have a genuine dilemma here. Not, as Velleman thinks because we are trying to 
compare one noumenal self with another, but because we are calling on two very 
different registers of justification. 
 
Now some might argue for the priority of the moral register. Some, like C.S. Lewis 
arguing from his Christian perspective have said that Eros functions like a false god 
lending a devilish authority to love’s imperatives. Others like Denis de Rougemont 
offer a transcendental argument. Writing about Tristan and Iseult he says (1991: 215): 
 
…like all other great lovers, they imagine that they have been ravished 
“beyond good and evil” into a kind of transcendental state outside 
ordinary experience, into an ineffable absolute irreconcilable with the 
world, but that they feel to be more real than the world. Their oppressive 
fate, even though they yield to it with wailings, obliterates the antithesis 
of good and evil and carries them away beyond the source of moral 
values, beyond pleasure and pain, beyond the realm of distinctions - into 
a realm where opposites cancel out. 
 
But there is something metaphysically extravagant in is these explanations. Velleman 
with his noumenal selves, Lewis with his false gods and De Rougemont with his 
transcendence into other realms all call on the mysterious to explain away the dilemma 
and assert the ultimate authority of morality over love. But our metaphysics need not 
get out of hand once we see that there is a plurality of justification and consequently 
either the agony of uncertainty or the certainty that comes from occupying only one of 
the frameworks of justification. As in Wittgenstein’s duck-rabbit illusion we cannot 
feel the authority of both perspectives at once and so we cannot compare the “strength” 
of each. 
 
Does this mean we cannot blame lovers for their moral failings? Must we accept Count 
Ladislaus’s moral calamities, his deceptions and murders? The answer is that we should 
not. The authority of love does not cancel out the authority of morality. We blame him 
and condemn his immorality. But when we shift perspective and entertain his 
justifications we understand his reasons. If he had left Katherine in her desert cave 
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while he calculated the limits of his moral duties he would have made a poor lover and 
we would have understood how Katherine would have grounds for resenting his 
romantic failings. 
 
The dilemmas that haunt moral philosophy and provide grist for the mill of romance 
persist because they are genuine dilemmas. I have tried to explain why they are genuine 
rather than illusory by showing how they involve incompatible claims to authority. I 
have explained the authority of love as resting on the justification supplied by the idea 
of agreement. The plausibility of this explanation is enhanced when we notice that 
morality’s own claim to authority rests on the same idea. The difference between the 
two is merely a difference in scope.7
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1 These claims do not go so far as to argue that the feeling of love can itself be commanded. For 
argument to this effect see Sankowski (1978). 
 
2 See Kant (1964: 118). 
 
3 Kant’s account of the beautiful and the sublime in the third Critique uses both as avenues to alert us to 
the “supersensible aspects” of our nature. See his discussion in the first part of The Critique of the Power 
of Judgment pp. 59-159. Mothersill (1984: 209-246) discusses this aspect of Kant’s ideas. 
 
4 The film is based on the novel The English Patient by Michael Ondaatje. 
 
5  For the contours of the distinction between excuses and justifications see Austin (1956), Hart, 
H.L.A..(1968), and Moore, M. (1990). 
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6 The idea that agreement is the source of justification for moral as well as political values is suggested in 
Rawls (1971, p.17) and Rawls (1980). The argument is more fully set out in Scanlon (1982) and (1998). 
 
7 I would like to thank Amelie Rorty and Heather Kennon for their comments on earlier drafts of this 
paper. 
